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In Case You Missed It: China Dream
April 5, 2010 in In Case You Missed It by The China Beat | 2 comments

By Christopher R. Hughes

Liu Mingfu 刘明福, China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic
Positioning of China in the Post-American Age (Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei
zhanlue dingwei). (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2010).
China Dream, by Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor at Beijing’s National Defense University, is the latest
of several books to speculate on how China can displace the leadership of the United States after the
global economic crisis. Understandably, Liu’s military background has led to conjecture over whether
his views reflect the ambitions of the PLA or even China’s leaders. Yet China Dream is most interesting
not so much for what it recommends for foreign and defense policies, as for what it says about the
deployment of nationalistic themes in the debates over China’s domestic politics.
As with works like Jiang Rong’s Wolf Totem (2004), and the 2009 title Unhappy China (co-written by
Huang Jisu, Liu Yang, Song Jiang, Song Xiaojun, and Wang Xiaodong), China Dream contains much
that will be of interest to anyone monitoring the belief in China’s racial supremacy, militarism and
political voluntarism. Yet, although Liu joins the chorus calling for a stronger military, it is wrong to
present him as an adventurist hawk. He is even prepared to acknowledge that the United States has
made some positive contributions to the world, quoting Mao’s view that the good American people
should be separated from the bad interest groups who drive its anti-China policies. He proposes that
war can be avoided if the United States behaves itself and China gives it enough time to adjust to the
age of “yellow fortune”, a synthesis of the superior civilisation of the East with the best elements of
the West.
This is quite different from the venomous anti-Americanism found in some of the authors of Unhappy
China, or the influential geopolitical thinker Zhang Wenmu, a professor at the Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics. Combined with other elements of the book, this raises the possibility
that China Dream reflects concerns in the military to divert the nationalist wave away from a show
down with the United States. This view becomes more compelling when the book shifts its focus
steadily towards a strong critique of what it regards as the low status of the military and the
corruption of the current political elite.
This trajectory can be seen in the way that Liu addresses the orthodoxy of China’s “peaceful rise”. On
the one hand he is happy to align with the leadership by citing Hu Jintao’s statement to the 17th CCP
Congress as evidence that China will not be a hegemonic or expansionist power. Yet he then goes on
to criticize those who harbour naïve illusions about the intentions of the United States because they do
not understand that concepts like “peaceful world” and “harmonious world” can only be realised in the
context of an international balance of power.

In case the relevance of this for contemporary debates is lost, Liu finishes this argument with a
critique of Zheng Bijian, the architect of the “peaceful rise” orthodoxy. Agreeing that China will not
become a “hegemonic” power, Liu differs from Zheng by insisting that great military power is still
necessary to protect national security, uphold world peace and achieve unification. A country with a
big economy and no military, he concludes, is like a plump sheep waiting in the market.
The significance of this argument becomes clearer when Liu adds his voice to those currently calling
for a revival of China’s “militaristic spirit” (shangwu jingshen 尚武精神). China Dream presents this in
the context of a grand historicist vision of the founding and decline of great dynasties, which is similar
to the argument developed in Wolf Totem. Rather than looking to the warlike culture of China’s
nomadic minorities, though, he looks to the founders of three great dynasties, Qin Shihuang, Han
Wudi and Tang Taizong as models for using force for unification, going on the offense to expel
enemies and combining soft with hard power. But Liu is careful to add that it was the CCP that revived
the “militaristic spirit” most recently, as demonstrated by the Korean War.
This is important, because when China Dream looks for an explanation of why the militaristic genes of
the great founders degenerate, the answer is found in the corruption of the bureaucratic political elite
and the enervating life style that comes with wealth and prosperity. The Song dynasty is thus singled
out as the source of China’s “culture weakening” (wen rouhua 文弱化), because it centralised power in
the Confucian bureaucracy in order to prevent the possibility of a military coup. The result was an
emphasis on compromise and retreat in foreign affairs, a mainstream philosophy that emphasised
peace at the expense of security, and a mistaken strategy of defending the south and neglecting the
north that left the country open to attack. Overall, argues Liu, the dynasty that produced by far the
largest number of theoretical texts on war craft ended up with a military that was bloated and lacking
in quality.
In this context, Zheng Bijian becomes just one representative of a much broader crisis afflicting
China’s political elite. This is made very clear when the last section of the book consists of four
chapters devoted to an exploration of the theory that China will collapse. One might expect Liu to
dismiss such a theory at the end of a book celebrating China’s rise to world dominance. Instead, he
quotes a warning given by Mao Zedong in 1956 that the most dangerous time for China would arrive
40-50 years later, when the country would have to deal with the temptations of corruption,
bureaucratism and great power chauvinism. He also cites Deng Xiaoping’s concerns over the threat to
stability posed by growing inequality of wealth. Returning to his grand historicist cycle, Liu then cites a
poem by Du Fu, of the Tang Dynasty, which attributes the demise of the Six Kingdoms and the Qin
Dynasty to internal causes.
Anger over corruption and inequality is of course widespread in China and makes up a significant part
of a book like Unhappy China. What China Dream shows is that the military also has a voice in this
clamour. Liu indicates that he is not alone in this respect when he cites an article carried in the press
cuttings section of the PLA newspaper Jiefangjun bao, in 2009, listing the problematic areas in which
China stands as number one in the world, such as the number of its bureaucrats, the cost of
government administration, the amount of public money spent by officials and the accidental death
rate. Neither does Liu pull his punches when he fixes the blame for this degeneration on the CCP,
using the fate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union to show what happens when the founding
generation of idealists is replaced by a group of people who pursue their own material interests.
Rather than dismiss the theory of China’s collapse, then, Liu doubts whether a possible economic
decline can be managed on the basis of growing inequality and corruption. This allows him to argue
that domestic corruption and ossification (jianghua 僵化) are the problems that will obstruct the search
for solutions to enormous domestic concerns like the greying of the population, rather than US-led
Westernisation and division.
When it comes to offering real solutions, however, aside from calling for “creativity” to solve the
“three big contradictions” of the environment, society and international affairs, Liu does little more
than side with the authoritarian and moralistic turn taking place in Chinese politics. At one point he
adds to the still tentative calls for a strong leader that are now appearing in Chinese texts, pointing
out that a rising nation needs a Lenin, Stalin, Mao or Deng to succeed. Interestingly, given current

speculation over divisions between the Youth League and the Shanghai factions at the top of the
Party, Liu even adds Jiang Zemin to this list of great dictators.
In the context of a China that is now looking beyond the CCP for ideological inspiration, it is also
notable that the figure of Sun Yatsen looms large throughout the book, although it is the National
Father’s advocacy of Chinese racial superiority that is stressed, rather than his contribution to
republican democracy. The paucity of this search for indigenous solutions is revealed, however, when
Liu falls back on a foreign author like John Naisbitt’s popular China’s Megatrends, to argue for the
possibility of a vertical, one-party “democracy with Chinese characteristics”. Again, such arguments
are only interesting to Liu because they are compatible with his desire to build a political system that
is superior to US democracy insofar as it can consolidate the use of power and creativity for the
demands of national strategy.
Yet it is the pessimistic conclusion of China Dream that is most striking, as Liu despairs that the
present situation is worse than it was under Mao and that CCP rule will be challenged if corruption
cannot be controlled. Even the creation of a stabilising welfare system seems impossible when CCP
cadres are working with “two hands” – one to serve the people, one to help themselves. Yet Liu
remains stuck on the horns of China’s political dilemma as he is unwilling to countenance the return to
using mass political movements to combat corruption, while the alternative of multiparty democracy is
condemned as part of an anti-Chinese US conspiracy.
That the best Liu can do to inject a note of optimism into the conclusion of China Dream is to cite a
number of quotes from Martin Jacques to confirm that China will not follow the fate of the Soviet
Union because the CCP will remain in control and the Chinese government is imbued with a high
degree of creativity, can only be taken as symptomatic of the conflicting emotions and political
paradoxes that are reflected in the current spate of political literature from China. Yet, rather than
expecting coherent theories and clear arguments, it is the ways in which nationalistic themes are
adopted and deployed by numerous actors in the discourse of domestic politics that makes such texts
so useful for gaining insights into China’s trajectory. In this respect Liu might have hit even more
headlines around the world if he had given his book the title Unhappy PLA.
Christopher R. Hughes is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and
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is Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

